c_o_M_M_E_N_T_A_R_Y_ _ _ _ _ ____.

·_1_ _ _ _ _ _ _

A Perspective on California's Regulation of
Tax Preparers, Certified Public Accountants,
Architects, and Landscape Architects
By Julianne B. D'Angelo and Robert C. Fellmeth
or thirteen years, the Center for Public 'Interest Law (CPIL) has monitored the activities of many of the
state's occupational licensing agencies,
and has preached a consistent theme. Government·should regulate a particular trade
or profession only after an honest assessment of the marketplace and any flaws
which present a threat of irreparable harm
or prev.ent normal marketplace functioning from driving out incompetent, dishonest, or impaired practitioners. The licensing alternative should be reserved for
trades and professions in which incompetence is likely,to cause irreparable harmthat is, harm for which money cannot
compensate. If there is likely irreparable
harm, then a:prior restraint-type barrier to
entry (licensing) which addresses and prevents that precise harm should be imposed; additionally, the licensing agency
should set industrywide standards of conduct and ethics, and police violations of
those standards through a vigorous enforcement program.
In the absence ·of probable irreparable
harm, numerous regulatory alternatives to
licensing should be considered. These include the posting of a bond to ensure a
fund to compensate injured consumers, a
certification program which has the effect
of disclosing information to consumers
about the qualifications of a practitioner
and protects the use of a title, a permit program, straightforward disclosure requirements, a rule of liability, straight statutory
prohibitions on certain activities, tax incentives to encourage certain behaviors, antitrust litigation to restore the normally-functioning marketplace, etc.
This fall, the Senate Subcommittee on
Efficiency and Effectiveness in State
Boards and Commissions, chaired by Senator Dan McCorquodale, is scheduled to
hold a series of interim hearings on the possible restructuring of several boards, commissions, and bureaus within the Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA). The
Legislative Analyst has already gone on record as supporting complete elimination of
many of the licensing programs to be reviewed by the Subcommittee, including the
agencies which regulate certified public accountants, boxers, barbers, cosmetologists,
guide dog trainers, cemeteries and crema-
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tories, funeral directors and embalmers,
private investigators, repossessors, security guards, electronic and appliance repair dealers, the home furnishings and
thermal insulation industries, landscape
architects, certified shorthand reporters,
and tax preparers.
Hopefully, the Subcommittee will
take an in-depth look at various professions and trades currently regulated by
DCA licensing boards, determine whether
licensing is an appropriate regulatory
mechanism or whether another regulatory alternative might better address the
market flaw which justifies regulation,
and seriously consider whether some licensing boards should be eliminated altogether, merged with other similar
boards, or restructured to better achieve
their public protection goals. CPIL will
participate in these hearings, and-as the
only entity in the state which regularly
monitors and publishes reports on the activities of these agencies-offers these
preliminary comments and suggestions
with respect to a few of the DCA boards
to be reviewed by the Subcommittee.

functioning of the marketplace, appears
to be a sufficient regulatory combination
for this occupation.
Although TPP referred a few cases of
criminal conduct by tax preparers to law
enforcement in 1992-93 (26 cases out of
1,737 complaints received were referred
for criminal action), TPP has no jurisdiction to deal with these cases. And other
than the referral of these 26 cases to law
enforcement, TPP engaged in negligible
enforcement activity in 1992-93 (it revoked three licenses and filed one accusation). However, it spent 78.1 % of its
budget on enforcement.
California is one of only two states
in the nation which regulates tax preparers, and the Tax Preparer Program has
gone in and out of existence twice since
1973-resulting in no visible difference
to California consumers.
In sum, TPP and its registration requirement should be abolished; its bond
requirement should be retained and
could be administered by a less costly
mechanism within the Department of
Consumer Affairs.

TAX PREPARER

STATE BOARD

PROGRAM

OF ACCOUNTANCY

Based upon the analysis set forth
above, the Tax Preparer Program (TPP)
should be abolished (with the exception of
its bond requirement). We perceive no irreparable harm from the negligent and/or
erroneous preparation of a tax return. To
be sure, there may be a harm resulting
from such negligent preparation-perhaps
a civil penalty on the taxpayer from the
IRS or FfB. But this harm is not irreparable; the civil penalty can be recouped
from the tax preparer's $5,000 bond, which
he/she is required to post under recent legislation carried by Senator Dan Boatwright. It would appear that this bond is
sufficient to cover the kind of civil penalties assessable against taxpayers who utilize the services of a tax preparer. Additionally, the "repeat business" dynamic of
the normal marketplace has considerable
force here; no consumer would return to a
tax preparer who is incompetent and errs
on tax returns, and that tax preparer will
eventually go out of business. The bond
requirement, coupled with the normal

Contrary to the opinion of the Legislative Analyst, CPIL believes the public
needs an occupational licensing agency
to regulate certified public accountants
(CPAs). Many societal actors (e.g., investors, lenders, government agencies, retirement systems, pension plans) rely on
the work and the word of CPAs in making
many different kinds of business decisions.
The recent crisis which has led to the
downfall of the savings and loan industry
is illustrative of the public's need for independent, objective, and competent analyses
and audits of financial data.
The California Supreme Court's recent decision in Bily v. Arthur Young &
Company, 3 Cal. 4th 370 (Aug. 27, 1992),
heightens the need for an effective CPA
board. In that case, the Supreme Court
essentially immunized CPAs from civil
liability for professional negligence to
consumers or members of the public
other than those with whom they have
contracted. In other words, "third party"
consumers who purchase stock in a com-
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pany in reliance on a certified financial
audit have no recourse in the courts if
that audit has been negligently prepared;
only those in "privity of contract" with
the CPA (i.e., the audited company) may
sue the CPA for professional negligence.
In issuing this ruling, the Supreme Court
overturned a 1986 case which had always been the law in California with regard to the liability of CPAs to those
who rely on their word. Whether or not
we agree with the Court's holding, its
impact is clear: the Board of Accountancy is the only remedy for those thirdparty victims and is the only mechanism
which can protect future clients of that
CPA. The Bily case has done for the accountancy profession what MoradiShalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,
46 Cal. 3d 287 (1988), did for the insurance industry: Both cases extinguished a
previously existing civil cause of action
and forced relatively dormant regulatory
agencies to provide an exclusive remedy
to injured consumers and the public in
general.
However, reliance on the regulatory
remedy to detect and sanction competitive abuse is misplaced when it comes
to the Board of Accountancy. Here, we
are forced to rely on a cartel structure to
represent the very different interests of
the general public. In our view, the capture of state police power by proprietary
interests has resulted in the following
consequences.
• The barrier to entry into the CPA
profession administered by the State
Board is excessive and unclear. According to the Business and Professions Code,
applicants for CPA licensure must fulfill
two primary requirements for licensure:
(I) passage of the nationally standardized CPA exam (section 5082), and (2)
completion of anywhere from 36 to 48
months of public accounting experience
(depending on whether any of this experience is completed "in the employ" of
a Board licensee) (section 5083). One year
of the required experience may be waived
if a candidate has a college degree in accounting or a related field (section 5084),
and candidates who lack public accounting
experience can still qualify for licensure if
they have sufficient "equivalent experience" (section 5083(d)).
With regard to the exam, we recognize that every state uses the same nationally standardized exam and that it is
probably futile to complain about it.
However, the pass rate on this exam is
extraordinarily low (and, by the way, is
one of the most closely-guarded secrets
in occupational regulation nationwide).
Most examinees must take the test at
6
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least three times to pass all five parts;
very few even attempt to take and pass
all five parts on the first try, and the pass
rate for those who do appears to be 15%
or less. Any exam which flunks this
many examinees is clearly testing more
than the minimum standards of competence for an entry-level CPA. Even the
State Bar exam has a 50% pass rate for
first-time takers. DCA Director Jim Conran recently threatened the Board of
Landscape Architects with sunset unless
that agency abandoned the use of a national exam with a 6% nationwide pass
rate (9% in California) (see below}, and
the Board of Accountancy's exam warrants the same challenge.
Then there is an additional barrier to
entry: the substantial experience requirement of section 5083. Exactly what kind
of experience qualifies toward licensure?
The legislature has required the Board to
adopt regulations "establishing the character and variety of experience necessary
to fulfill the experience requirements set
forth in this section" (section 5083(d)).
So the Board adopted Rule 11.5, Title 16
of the California Code of Regulations,
which very generally sets forth various
kinds of accounting and auditing tasks
which must be included in any qualifying experience. But Rule 11.5 neglects
to include an important requirement imposed by the Board: All applicants must
submit at least 500 hours of qualifying
experience. Is this requirement in the
statute? No. Is it in the rule which the
legislature required the Board to adopt?
No. Well, then how do applicants find
out about it? It's printed on "Form E,"
the form which the employer(s) of a CPA
applicant must complete to verify that
the applicant has gained experience. In
regulatory parlance, this is called "underground rulemaking"-the enforcement
of a policy or standard of general application without adopting it through the
rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Additionally, over the past few years,
the Board has completely overhauled its
policy as to what qualifies as "experience" under Rule 11.5. Prior to 1989, the
Board strictly interpreted the rule to require applicants to prove "demonstrate[d] satisfactory knowledge" of 17 auditing procedures. In response to requests from the professional associations, the Board changed its interpretation of this rule in March 1990. Apparently, the Board no longer requires applicants to have performed an actual
audit, and instead requires applicants to
have engaged in experience which "enables the applicant .to demonstrate that

he/she has an understanding of the requirements of planning and constructing
an audit with minimum supervision
which results in full disclosure financial
statements."
This change was debated for two
years and apparently represents a policy
consensus on the part of the Board and
the profession. We do not take issue with
the substance of the change and-to the
extent that the burdensome licensure requirements are eased for CPA applicants
such that more can be licensed, enter this
profession, and give consumers greater
choice in this area-we endorse it. However, the way in which the Board accomplished this very important policy change
illustrates its modus operandi. Once again,
the Board did not sponsor a bill to initiate a legislative amendment, nor did it
commence the rulemaking process to
amend Rule 11.5; either of these processes would have given CPA applicants
and their employers fair notice of the
standards to which they are held for purposes of CPA licensure. In order to accomplish this change, the Board simply
modified the instructions to employers
on Form E. Obviously, this particular
change is not insignificant. In our view,
the Board's method of adopting this
change also violates the APA. It deprives
both CPA applicants and their employers
of clear licensing criteria and standards
which the Board is solely responsible for
promulgating, and enables the Board and
its Qualifications Committee (see below)
to engage in arbitrary licensing decisions.
Finally. the Board has failed to properly set forth any criteria whatsoever
which define "equivalent experience"
(section 5083(d}) for candidates who
lack public accounting experience. At
meeting after meeting of this Board, we
have witnessed members of the Board's
Qualifications Committee express confusion as to what types of experience it
should accept as "equivalent." In August
1990, the Board simply instructed the
Committee to evaluate these applications
"on a case-by-case basis"-obviously an
unacceptable way to run a licensing program. Although section 5083(d} clearly
requires the Board to adopt regulations
establishing criteria for acceptable "equivalent experience," the Board has yet to
comply with this directive.
• Excessive Privatization. The Board
of Accountancy is a large board, consisting of twelve members. Eight of these
are Board licensees (seven CPAs and one
public accountant, a license no longer issued by the Board}, and the other four
are non-licensee public members.
As a preliminary matter, we object to
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the supermajority of professional members on this Board. This is not a novel
objection, either by CPIL or by other
public interest organizations. The purpose of this Board-and all boards
within the Department of Consumer Affairs-is to protect consumers from incompetent, dishonest, and impaired practitioners. This Board is charged with exercising state police power toward the
goals of consumer protection, consumer
information, and consumer choice in the
marketplace; and, toward those ends, not
all of its decisions may be in the financial interests of the CPA profession. The
presence of an excessive number of practitioners on this Board inhibits this function, as their statutory charge may conflict with their personal and professional
pecuniary interests. In our view, there is
no rational justification for the presence
of professional members on occupational
licensing boards charged with consumer
protection; the profession is perfectly capable of, and very successful in, representing itself before the Board and the
legislature. If subject-matter expertise is
needed for a particular policy decision,
a small standing advisory panel of practitioners could be created to advise the
Board. There is simply no reason why
the actual decisionmakers should or must
be licensees.
In addition to the excessive number
of CPAs on the Board itself, state law
permits the Board to utilize the services
of numerous non-Board-member CPAs
to carry out its licensing and enforcement functions, at an extraordinary cost
to CPAs (through licensing fees) and to
consumers (to whom CPAs pass those licensing fees). As a result of this authorization, the Board operates largely through
a massive committee structure, and most
members of these committees are not appointed members of the Board. For example, under Business and Professions
Code section 5020, the current membership of the Board's Administrative Committee, which oversees the Board's enforcement program, is 17, and none of
these individuals are appointed Board
members. The current membership of the
Board's Qualifications Committee, which
reviews the applications and Rule 11.5
experience completion forms of candidates for licensure (see above), is at least
20 (it was 26 in 1992), and none of these
individuals are appointed Board members. The Board has at least six other
standing committees, and most of the
members of these committees are not
Board members. These committees are
not autonomous, but their recommendations are largely rubberstamped without

detailed review by the full Board at its
quarterly meetings.
This kind of committee structure is
unheard of elsewhere in the Department
of Consumer Affairs. For thirteen years,
CPIL has monitored almost all other
DCA agencies, and not one of them is
permitted to utilize non-Board-member
private-practice "volunteers" to the extent this Board does. And this structure
is not free. In 1990-9 I, the Board and
its many committees held 65 meetings
(an average of over one per week!) at a
cost of $289,000, including $152,000 for
travel, $26,000 for meeting sites, and
$111,000 for per diem payments to "volunteers."
The cost of this use of non-Boardmember "volunteers" is obviously inappropriate, but the effect is even more significant. This Board is effectively-and
improperly-delegating its state police
power licensing and enforcement authorities to private individuals. These "volunteers" are able to strongly influence licensing and enforcement decisions affecting their colleagues and their competitors, without meaningful accountability to the public.
• Absence of Aggressive Enforcement Program. Contrary to the frequent
representations of the Board and the CPA
professional societies, the Board of Accountancy does not have an adequate enforcement program. Out of 6,039 inquiries received in 1992-93, the Board generated only 814 formal complaints, and
took only 63 disciplinary actions (26 of
which were stipulated). While these statistics are extremely low, they actually
represent an improvement over past
years, when the Board's enforcement
program was literally moribund. The entire Lincoln Savings & Loan debacle resulted in the discipline of one CPA's license by this Board-and that individual
got straight probation.
Additionally, the Board spends only
a little over one-half of its budget on enforcement-much less than other boards
which regulate practitioners who can
wreak irreparable harm on the public.
Finally, the Board spends an excessive amount of its enforcement resources
and energy policing "unlicensed practice" (i.e., competition for CPAs). Of the
929 cases the Board says it closed in
1992-93, 346 were for unlicensed or unregistered practice. We believe the public
would be better served if the Board
would pursue incompetent and dishonest
CPAs rather than expending its limited
enforcement resources attempting to
drive out the competition of the CPA
profession.
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• The Board acts more like a cartel
than a state agency. The State Board of
Accountancy-controlled by CPAs-appears more concerned with suppressing
competition from non-CPAs who are
lawfully permitted to perform some of
the same functions as CPAs (such as tax
preparers and non-CPA accountants
functioning under Business and Professions Code section 5052) than with policing its own. For example, the Board
recently began to enforce Rule 2, Title
16 of the California Code of Regulations, which prohibits anyone but a CPA
from using the unmodified terms "accountant" or "accountancy" to describe
him/herself or offered services. The Board
claims that consumers are confused by a
non-CPA's use of these terms, and that
many consumers believe that someone
holding him/herself out as an "accountant" must be licensed by the state. Others (including CPIL and non-CPA accountants and their professional associations) argue that the CPA-controlled
Board is attempting to capture the use of
a generic term to prevent the competition
from truthfully and effectively advertising in telephone directories and other
media, in violation of non-CPAs' first
amendment commercial speech rights
and due process rights.
This issue has been litigated for about
five years, culminating in the California
Supreme Court's decision in Bonnie
Moore v. State Board of Accountancy, 2
Cal. 4th 999 ( 1992), cert. denied,
_U.S._ (Feb. 22, 1993); CPIL appeared as an amicus curiae on behalf of
the non-CPA plaintiff Bonnie Moore. In
a 4-3 decision, the majority of the California Supreme Court held that the
Board's adoption of Rule 2 was within
its authority, but that the rule is unconstitutional because it is overly broad. The
Court ruled that the Board must allow
non-CPA accountants to use the terms
"accountant" and "accountancy" in their
advertising if those terms are accompanied with a disclaimer stating that the
practitioner is not licensed or that the
services offered do not require a license.
Although the Supreme Court found Rule
2 to be constitutionally defective, the
Board has not yet changed its rule.
It is important to note that the Board
of Accountancy has never claimed that
Bonnie Moore has held herself out to be
a certified public accountant or engaged
in tasks and functions reserved for a certified public accountant. In other words,
the Bonnie Moore case does not concern
allegations of unlicensed practice. Moore
and her co-plaintiffs are lawfully engaged
in tasks and functions for which the
7
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legislature requires no license, and the
legislature has never precluded non-CPA
accountants from using the terms "accountant" or "accountancy." The CPAcontrolled Board has assumed that role
for itself.
Whereas the profession sees the Board
as its reflection and its protection, the actual role of the State Board is to protect
consumers from incompetent and dishonest CPAs, provide accurate information to consumers in the marketplace,
and preserve consumer choice. The State
Board should be above turf battles between different segments of the accounting profession, and should evenhandedly
regulate the CPA profession with an eye
toward consumer protection. The State
Board belongs to the public, not to the
CPA profession.
In sum, the state's licensure of certified public accountants is justified. However, the membership of the existing
State Board of Accountancy should be
revamped; its licensing exam should be
scrutinized and it should be required to
appropriately clarify its other entry standards; its excessive use of non-Boardmember private-practice CPAs in licensing and enforcement decisionmaking
should be eliminated; its enforcement
program should be properly resourced
and professionalized; and its repeated attempts to protect the CPA profession
from competition should be declared as
against public policy.

BOARD OF
LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTS

The Board of Landscape Architects
should be abolished. We perceive no irreparable harm from the incompetent
preparation of landscape planning and
design documents. As with tax preparers,
there may be a harm resulting from such
incompetence-perhaps monetary injury
and attorneys' fees for a civil suit. But
this harm is not irreparable. If the threatened harm is monetary only (as opposed
to death, serious bodily injury, or other
irreparable harm), the preferred regulatory alternative is the posting of a bond.
And also as with tax preparers, the "repeat business" dynamic of the normal
marketplace has considerable force here;
no consumer would return to or recommend a landscape architect who is incompetent, and that landscape architect
will eventually go out of business. A
bond requirement, coupled with the normal functioning of the marketplace, appears to be a sufficient regulatory combination for this profession.
A properly functioning occupational
licensing agency has three roles:
8

( 1) formulation and administration of
a barrier to entry (e.g., exam(s), educational requirement, experience requirement, or combination thereof) which is
capable of and tailored to preventing incompetent people from practice, because
incompetent practice will cause irreparable harm to the public;
(2) the establishment of industrywide
standards of professional conduct and
behavior for licensees which protect the
public from the irreparable harm which
justifies licensing; and
(3) aggressive policing of violations
of those professional standards through
a vigorous enforcement program.
Evaluating the Board of Landscape
Architects on these three criteria, we
conclude that the Board has failed in all
three areas.
• Barrier to Entry. For many years,
the Board has administered a nationally
standardized licensing exam which has
an extremely low pass rate. The 199 I national pass rate on the Board's exam was
6%; the California pass rate was 9%.
These 1991 figures are not unusual; for
several years, the Board expressed some
dissatisfaction with the national organization which prepared the test but took
no action because licensees and prospective licensees wanted to preserve license
reciprocity with other states. In other
words, the Board kept using this licensing exam in order to enable California
licensees to practice in other states!
In December 1991, DCA Director Jim
Conran expressed serious concerns about
the Board's continued use of this exam.
DCA's Central Testing Unit examined the
test, concluded that numerous items were
not related to the practice of landscape architecture, and identified several key problems with the development and grading of
the exam. Conran directly told the Board
that he would support a bill calling for its
sunset unless it abandoned use of the national exam and developed its own exam
which tests minimum standards of competence instead of "mastery" of landscape architecture. Regarding the reciprocity issue,
Conran properly told the Board that "the
fundamental purpose of state licensing programs is to protect the public of the state
issuing the license. Reciprocity can only
be an incidental benefit, not the primary
reason for state licensure." Under Conran's
threat-and only under his threat, the
Board broke from the national organization
and has developed its own test. The first
administration of the new test occurred in
June 1993, and the pass rate apparently exceeded 40%. While this is a substantial improvement over the national exam pass
rate, it is still quite low for people who are

required to have six years of education
and/or experience.
In other words, the Board has finally
revamped its entry criteria only in response to the threats of a particularly aggressive DCA Director. Left to its own
devices, who knows how long the Board
would have continued to impose the artificial barrier to entry into the landscape
architecture profession in California.
• Establishing Professional Standards. The Board does literally no standard-setting for the practice of landscape
architecture in California. The only regulations the Board has ever adopted pertain to its licensing exam and the general
barrier to entry into the profession in
California. Outside of one provision
which requires landscape architects to
include their license number in advertising, not one Board regulation pertains to
post-entry standards of conduct.
• Enforcement. And the Board's enforcement program is non-existent. The
Board received only 59 complaints in
1992-93, and only 43 complaints in
1991-92 (and 33 of those were from
members of the profession, presumably
complaining about unlicensed practice).
The Board did not take one disciplinary
action during either year. To our knowledge, this Board has revoked only two
licenses in the past five years. It spends
only 25% of its budget on enforcement.
If Senator Boatwright's well-known regulatory agency evaluation benchmark
("enforcement, enforcement, enforcement!") is applied honestly to this Board,
it flunks.
In short, the Board's licensing scheme
serves primarily to protect existing members of the profession from competition,
which does not serve public protection
or public choice in the marketplace. And
in the two other areas of traditional occupational licensing agency function, it
does nothing of value toward its consumer
protection mandate. The Board should be
abolished and replaced with a bond requirement.
During the many years in which we
have advocated abolition of this Board,
we have heard well-articulated and passionate pleas from members of the profession about the positive contributions
made by landscape architects. For example, landscape architects implement the
federal Americans with Disabilities Act
and statutes requiring water conservation, soil erosion protection, fire protection, and habitat creation and restoration.
We laud these activities, but they have
nothing to do with the issue before the
legislature: whether the harm presented
by incompetent landscape architects is
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i"eparable ·so as to justify licensure. We
submit that there is no real risk of irreparable harm; even if there were, this
Board fails to address it meaningfully.
The Board .and the members of the
profession have also set forth a "parade
of horribles" should the Board and its
licensure requirement be abolished. Essentially, they .appear to argue that the
state's failure ·to license landscape architects will result in the flight of all landscape architects from California, such
that we would be deprived of their admittedly valuable contributions. This is
fairly ludicrous, as was the insurance
industry's similar claim that all insurance
companies wou'ld abandon California if
Proposition I 03 passed in I 988 (which
it did, and-lo and behold-several insurance companies still sell policies in
California!). The notion that any industry
would abandon the largest and wealthiest
state in the nation due to governmental
regulation (or 'lack thereof) is simply not
credible.
The profession also claims that landscape architects would be unable to procure liability insurance should the state
fail to issue a landscape architect license.
But the presence or absence of a licensure category is •not critical to insurance
availability; many licensed occupations
have extraordinary trouble insuring their
businesses (e.g., the child care industry),
and many unlicensed occupations have
no trouble insuring their businesses (e.g.,
owners of retail stores and developers).
We hear no complaints from landscape
architects in states which do not license
them regarding the unavailability of liability insurance. Besides, landscape architects frequently work as subcontractors to other professionals who maintain
liability insurance and whose policies
can be adjusted to cover the work of the
landscape architect. Even if the profession is correct that insurance will be
harder to get should the state abolish the
licensure requirement, the Insurance
Commissioner can cure that problem
with appropriate rulemaking to require
the insurance industry to issue policies
commensurate with the risks posed by
the landscape architecture profession.
The insurance industry has no reason
to boycott landscape architects as a
group. If insurers are so insecure in their
ability to evaluate the competence and
hence risk presented by a group of practitioners so as deny coverage categorically, a more precise remedy than the
Board's full-blown licensing system
would be "certification" of minimum
competence through education and/or
examination with title protection for the

term "landscape architect." But there is
no reason to deny everyone the right to
advise on landscaping for compensation
simply because some persons have difficulty obtaining insurance. The requirement of a "license" to practice imposes
unnecessary restraints to solve a phantom problem which-if real-the "certification" of competence of those using
the title "landscape architect" would address.
In sum, the Board of Landscape Architects and its licensure requirement
should be abolished and replaced it with
a required bond, to ensure the availability of a fund from which injured consumers could be compensated, and which
could be less expensively administered
by the Department of Consumer Affairs.
At the very most, the Subcommittee
might consider some sort of certification
program which would protect use of the
title "landscape architect."

BOARD OF
ARCHITECTURAL EXAMINERS

CPIL believes that there is a risk of
irreparable harm (physical injury and/or
death) due to improperly designed structures, such that existence of the Board
of Architectural Examiners is justified.
CPIL also observes that the Board's
stringent licensure requirements (eight
years of education and experience and
the passage of a nationally standardized
written test and a California oral exam)
appear to be screening out incompetent
architects without being overly burdensome, as reflected in a 53% pass rate for
the written exam and a 66% pass rate for
the oral exam. The Board receives very
few complaints (293 in 1992-93, 130 of
which were from members of the profession presumably complaining about unlicensed practice) and takes very little
disciplinary action.
However, we have four comments
about the Board's operations.
• Oral Examination. To qualify for
licensure, the Board requires applicants
to pass an extensive multi-day written
exam provided by the National Council
of Architectural Registration Boards
(NCARB) and a one-hour oral examination administered in California. Recently,
the Board (and particularly its staff) has
questioned the continued need for the
oral exam, because:
-DCA's Central Testing Unit (CTU)
has criticized the use of an oral exam in
addition to a written exam unless there
are some demonstrated "higher order"
skills needed to competently practice
which cannot be tested on a written
exam. CTU properly questions what the
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Board's oral exam adds to the extensive
written exam, and the Board should answer this question.
-CTU has also criticized the Board's
method of administering its oral exam,
noting that it is administered by different
exam commissioners who have varying
levels of training and experience, such
that there is no assurance of consistent
grading among the various commissioners.
-In spite of the fact that the oral exam
appears to have problems in content and
grading, the Board has no appeals process for the oral exam.
-The oral exam is extremely expensive to administer. The Board recently
had to increase the fee for the oral exam
to$ I00 (in addition to the written exam,
which now costs $490), because its cost
to administer the oral exam was $255,000
more than the fee generated!
The Board should revisit this issue.
• Written Contract Requirement. The
Board of Architectural Examiners should
seek legislation requiring architect-consumer contracts for professional services
to be in writing; all changes thereafter
agreed to by the parties should similarly
be in writing. Many other trades and professions have a written contract requirement (e.g., attorneys, home improvement
and swimming pool contractors, appliance repair dealers, automotive repair
dealers), and they generally serve to promote clearer communication between licensee and consumer and eliminate midor post-project confusion and disputes
which eventually clog our courts. The
largest percentage of complaints closed
by the Board in 1992-93 ( other than unlicensed practice) concerned contractual
disputes; the Board could both provide
greater consumer protection and eliminate these complaints if it adopted a
written contract requirement.
The genesis of the written contract requirement is the adhesive relationship
often extant between licensees and their
customers. Small builders often use the
services of architects. They may agree on
a contract price. But as with many professions, it is difficult to arrive at a secure price for services to be rendered in
the future. Often, the design is subject to
alteration, or to a new fact or preference
requiring additional work. How much
should one charge beyond the agreed
price? Traditionally, many professionals
have been in an advantageous position
in billing; they control a valuable asset
in which the consumer has invested substantial moneys. It is not uncommon for
such professionals, especially for attorneys and engineers, to submit a high bill
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which is totally unexpected for relatively
minor additional work beyond an agreedto price. Often, the submission is made
shortly before a trial or important hearing by an attorney, or just before a building permit application must be submitted
by an engineer. In either case, a kind of
extortion ensues-one which has been a
continuing problem for consumers.
Attorneys are bound by a special fiduciary duty to bill fairly; the State Bar's
attorney discipline system has been
strengthened recently to assist in such efforts. The Bar has also developed an extensive fee dispute arbitration system. Finally, the State Bar Act now requires that
services expected to exceed $1,000 be
subject to a written contract to assure the
enforceability of the amounts charged.
Other professions and trades have
also responded in varying degrees to this
problem, such as the Contractors State
License Board and the Board of Landscape Architects (the latter now requiring
written contracts). But the boards regulating architects and engineers have
failed or refused to impose any check on
the billing abuses borne of adhesive advantage. In the case of the architect, the
plans are in the hands of the professional
and require building permit approval.
The architect is in a position to render a
large bill. There may be no practical substitute in terms of alternative plans.
There may be a time limit which requires
acquiescence to an unfair, last-minute
bill.
The problem of excessive billing has
much precedent. The optimum solution
is to follow the tried and true law of contracts, adjusting appropriately for the adhesive setting which may be likely. This
means simply that once a price has been
agreed to, the professional abides by it
until and unless an alteration is agreed
to by the customer-and in advance of
the services to be rendered. The customer has the right to say, "I can't afford
it if it will cost that," "Forget it," or "I
know someone else who will do it for
less, even taking into account the value
of the prior work." This means that an
original price estimate may change, but
it will not change based on the unilateral
imposition of one party. As fair as such
a rule may appear to be, it is honored in
the breach by most professionals. The
Board of Architectural Examiners has
yet to impose the kind of check which
is appropriate and warranted.
• Price Fixing. Architects have traditionally offered their services for a fee
which equals a percentage of the final
project cost, particularly for large commercial projects. Such a formula consti10
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lutes, on its face, an unjustified form of
horizontal price fixing. Any price formula
which is unrelated to cost and which facilitates agreement between competitors
is a subject of proper concern for a regulator. The broad enabling acts commonly applicable to trade or professional
regulation expect the regulator to assure
fair competition and to avoid marketplace abuse, particularly those which
create a market flaw. Ironically, many
regulated professions have used the fact
of regulation to engage in such price fixing-expecting those who enforce antitrust law to defer to the oversight presence of the regulator. Real estate brokers,
with their traditional commission of 6%
of sale price for residential properties,
are a case in point. The imposition of
8% of project cost as the architect's fee
includes all of the above abuses. The architectural service costs and the project
costs may have only a very vague relationship. To the extent that this pricing
pattern persists, it should be a priority of
the Board to end it affirmatively. Its task
is not to represent the economic interests
of practitioners, nor to facilitate or countenance economic arrangements which
create market flaws. Rather, its intended
task is to address existing market flaws
and compensate for them in the interests
of the larger citizenry.
• Proprietary Specifications. Architects design major private and public real
property projects. Their work includes
more than plans; it includes the specification of materials to be used. A common
historical abuse in this area has been the
use of "proprietary" or "canned" specifications. This often occurs when one entity
has an exclusive dealership for a given
product. Its distributor is happy to provide a "canned" specification for a material which can only be met by a single
brand: his.
For example, a building needs inside
ceilings. Alpha Product's manufacturer or
distributor might give to an architect, for
her use, a prewritten specification for inside ceilings of a type, size, and composition which describes only Alpha Product. The easy-to-plug-in canned specification may save the architect some work,
and-if she has an interest in the enterprise-perhaps facilitate substantial side
profit. This practice is often difficult to
detect. General contractors bidding on
the project will call the Alpha distributor,
who will give them all the same high
price to include in all of their respective
bids. They all know that this is the material which must be used, and they all
know they are all getting the same high
price in estimating a bid to build. And

the architect generally makes 8% of the
project price.
Is the Board proactively monitoring
for these kinds of breaches of fiduciary
duty? Where? How?

CONCLUSION
Congratulations to the Subcommittee
for taking the kind of proactive look at
these agencies which the agencies should
be replicating in their examination of the
industries they regulate.
The boards and bureaus selected for
examination by the Subcommittee-only
a few of which are discussed abovevary substantially. A justification for the
licensure of tax preparers and landscape
architects is difficult to understand. Although arguments for bonding the former and certification for the latter could
be made, a full-blown prior restraint licensing system lacks merit. In contrast,
the existence of licensing boards for accountants and architects has an articulable rationale: These professionals are
capable of wreaking irreparable harm if
incompetent. But there are serious flaws
involving both of these boards. The
Board of Architectural Examiners exhibits some promise as a regulatory entity,
but it has yet to challenge the tribal rules
of the profession, a common malady
among regulatory bureaucracies. And as
to the State Board of Accountancy, it is
preferable to have no agency than the
one currently presiding. This agency is
symptomatic of the worst features of our
political system: capture of the state by
a vested profit-stake interest.
Regrettably, the same interests excessively influence the legislature as well.
California has no campaign contribution
limitations for legislative or statewide officials currently in force. Those with an
immediate proprietary stake in public
policies control the agencies empowered
to act on behalf of all of us. And they
inhibit our elected representatives from
providing the countervailing check the
founding fathers intended. The condition
precedent to any meaningful regulatory
reform is thusly framed: The state must
consider long-run and larger impacts,
and the state must decide on the merits.
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